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I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of the invalidation of the heart of the Communications
Decency Act ("CDA") by the United States Supreme Court, in the case of
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,' is there any way in which Congress
can constitutionally limit non-obscene speech on the Internet on the Fround
that such speech is "indecent," pornographic, or "harmful to minors"?
The CDA provisions which were struck down as violative of the First
Amendment essentially made it illegal to use the Internet to knowingly
* Copyright 1999, Marc Rohr. The author wishes to thank his Goodwin research

assistant, Judy Stroud, for her assistance in the production of this article.
1. 117 S.Ct. 2329 (1997).
2. Even if Congress can constitutionally do so, it may well be that only Congress can do
so, because any similar regulation enacted by a state might violate the Commerce Clause, as
was held by a federal district court in American LibrariesAss'n. v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160,
169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
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transmit an "indecent" communication to a minor, or to display a "patently
offensive" sexual communication "in a manner available to" a minor.
The question that remains is whether Congress can do anything to cure
the defects that led to the invalidation of the CDA. In exploring that
question, the first part of this article will briefly review the relevant pre-Reno
precedents at the Supreme Court level. It will then proceed to an analysis of
the Supreme Court ruling in Reno, as well as a brief consideration of the two
lower court decisions4 that held the CDA invalid prior to the Supreme Court
ruling. Finally, this article will consider, in light of those rulings,
the
5
constitutionality of the recently enacted Child Online Protection Act.
II. THE RELEVANT PRE-RENO PRECEDENTS
Beginning in the early 1970s, the Supreme Court developed the general
rules governing the validity of regulations of speech under the First
Amendment. In the absence of a special rule applicable to the kind of
regulation at issue, the Court typically asks whether a regulation of speech is
content based or content neutral, and, if it is content based, the Court
scrutinizes the regulation strictly, requiring the government to employ means
narrowly tailored to accomplish a government interest of compelling
magnitude. 6 The regulation must be necessary to the achievement of the
important goal,7 and it must represent the least restrictive means of doing
3. See infra text accompanying note 69.
4. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff'd, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Shea
v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 2501 (1997).
5. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1998)).
Freedom of speech issues involving the Internet have also arisen in other contexts, which are
beyond the scope of this article. Those contexts include: state regulations, see ACLU v.
Johnson, 4 F. Supp. 2d 1029 (D.N.M. 1998); Urofsky v. Allen, 995 F. Supp. 634 (E.D. Va.
1998); American Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); ACLU v.
Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997); university policies, see Loving v. Boren, 133 F.3d
771 (10th Cir. 1998); county library policies, see Mainstream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees,
24 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Va. 1998); city web site limitations, see Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of
Cookeville, 23 F. Supp. 2d 822 (M.D. Tenn. 1998); other aspects of the Communications
Decency Act, see Apollomedia Corp. v. Reno, 19 F. Supp. 2d 1081 (N.D. Cal. 1998); federal
obscenity laws, see United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996); and the Federal
Child Pornography Prevention Act, see Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, No. C 97-0281VSC,
1997 WL 487758 (N.D. Cal. 1997). See also S.B. 97, 106th Cong. (1998) and H.R. Res. 368,
106th Cong. (1999), which would require blocking and filtering of Internet access via
computers in public schools and libraries.
6. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York State
Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
7. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
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so.8 While the point is not clearly established, there is also some basis in the
case law for contending that to survive this level of judicial scrutiny, a
regulation must be effective in achieving its goal. 9 Because the CDA was
undeniably a content based regulation of speech, "strict scrutiny" was in fact
used by the Court in Reno. 10
But some special rules, and some other important general principles,
had been established prior to the emergence of those general rules pertaining
to content based regulations of speech. In 1957, the Court held that
"obscenity," properly defined, was entitled to no constitutional protection, 11
a position to which it has adhered ever since. 12 At about the same time, in a
case called Butler v. Michigan,1 3 the Court ruled that a state could not
completely prohibit the distribution of literature deemed harmful only to
minors, because it would have the effect of reducing the adult population to
reading only that which was fit for children to read. 14 That proposition,
stated at a time prior to the Court's development of the great bulk of the
rules that govern free speech cases today, was put forth as an independent
principle, and was apparently the basis for the result in Butler. In 1968, in
contrast, in a case called Ginsberg v. New York,' 5 the Court upheld a state
statute that prohibited the sale of certain materials-defined as obscene as to
minors-only to minors; 16 thus, the principle of Butler was not violated. 17
A general principle that appears to be well established, first articulated
in
the
decision
in Cohen
California
reaffirmed
later
9 is that
rulings, 11971
government
mayv. not
suppress and
speech
simply by
because

8. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
9. See TurnerBroad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994), which borrows oftquoted language to that effect from a commercial speech case, Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S.
761, 770-71 (1993). Since commercial speech is said to receive less protection than noncommercial speech, it follows logically that strict scrutiny must be understood as requiring at
least as persuasive a justification for limiting non-commercial speech as is required in the case
of a regulation of commercial speech. See also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915-16 (1996),
to the same effect, but applying strict scrutiny in the context of an Equal Protection Clause
challenge.
10. See infra text accompanying note 54.
11. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
12. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987).
13. 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
14. Id. at 383.
15. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
16. Id. at 639.
17. Id. at 643.
18. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
19. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46
(1988); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
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unwilling viewers or listeners may be offended thereby. The Court has
never explicitly stated that the government interest in shielding unwilling
listeners from offensive speech fails to rise to the level of magnitude
required of a content based regulation of speech. Instead, the Court has
said, in effect, that we are inescapably subject to speech that offends us,
outside the privacy of our homes, and that we are obliged to "[avert] our
eyes" in such situations, at least when doing so is a feasible response to the
offensive stimulus.2' The Court has also recognized the difficulty of
regulating speech
drawing workable lines when one begins to contemplate
22
according to its offensiveness or "outrageousness."
But FCCv. PacificaFoundation, decided in 1978, was a special case,
and the government's victory therein predictably encouraged the government
to engage in further attempts to regulate in the name of protecting children
Pacifica involved the famous George Carlin
from "indecent" speech.
monologue, which a 5radio station broadcast at midday, concerning the
"seven 'dirty words"' that one could not say on radio or television. The
station was consequently sanctioned by the FCC, acting pursuant to a federal
statute which allowed the FCC to prohibit "obscene" or "indecent" speech
26
on radio or television. The Supreme Court, explicitly focusing only on the
FCC's application of the law to this radio station in this instance, upheld the
FCC's action, placing great weight on the facts that (a) radio broadcasts
come into the home; and (b) children are in the audience.27 The majority
strongly implied that the time of day of the broadcast made a difference."
Although the Court appeared to recognize the FCC's action as based on the
content of speech, references to strict judicial scrutiny were nowhere to be
seen. In upholding the FCC's action, moreover, the Court devoted no time
or energy to the constitutionality of the governing statute, which, again,
prohibited "indecent" speech over the public airwaves. "Indecency," it is
important to note, has never been a legal term of art, like obscenity,
embodying an established meaning.
It has become a familiar, if somewhat fuzzy, tenet of First Amendment
law that broadcasting receives less than the usual amount of First
Amendment protection, a maxim that provided some support for the
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
Id.
Id. at 25; Hustler, 485 U.S. at 55.
438 U.S. 726 (1978).
Id. at 738.
Id. at 770.
Id. at. 731 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976)).
Id. at 763-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Pacifica,438 U.S. at 750.
See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co., v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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holding in Pacifica. Partly for that reason, Pacificahas proven to be fairly
easy to distinguish from later cases involving different media of
communication.
When government has sought to protect minors from
ostensibly harmful communications via mail or301telephone,3 1 for example,
Pacifica has been distinguished-mail, because its impact on small children
was seen as so much smaller,32 and "dial-a-porn" telephone communications,
because 33they do not come into the home in an unsought and unexpected
manner.

The 1989 "dial-a-porn" decision, Sable Communications v. FCC,34 is
significant for another reason as well-namely the Court's use of strict
scrutiny, which by 1989 had become a fairly dependable judicial response to
a content based regulation of speech. Again, a well-established component
of strict scrutiny is the insistence that the government employ the least
restrictive means of regulating the targeted speech. In Sable, the Court
recognized a compelling interest on the part of the government in protecting
children from emotionally harmful communications, 35 and appeared willing
to believe that the pornographic telephone conversations in question might
be harmful. But, because there was evidence in the record of alternative
methods of shielding children from these pornographic messages, the Court
was not persuaded that a total ban represented the least restrictive means of
doing37so. 36 The principle of the Butler case, meanwhile, was again set
forth.
With respect to cable television, it appeared for nearly a decade that the
Supreme Court perceived that medium as differing significantly from
broadcast television, 38 but in a more recent opinion a plurality of the Court
emphasized the similarities of those two media.39 In that case, which
involved federal regulation of "indecency" on cable television, a plurality of
the court declined to employ strict scrutiny, despite the clearly content based
nature of the regulation, because of uncertainty as to the appropriate

30. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
31. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
32. Bolger,463 U.S. at 74.
33. Sable, 492 U.S. at 128.
34. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
35. Id. at 122. See also Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518
U.S. 727, 755 (1996) (plurality opinion); id. at 806 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
36. Sable, 492 U:S. at 128-29.
37. Id. at 126-27.
38. Wikinson v. Jones, 480 U.S. 926 (1987), affg Jones v. Wilkinson, 800 F.2d 989
(10th Cir. 1986), aff'g Community Televison v. Wilkinson, 611 F. Supp. 1099 (D. Utah

1985).
39. DenverArea Educ. Telecomm. Consortium,518 U.S. 727.
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standards to apply to a medium of communication seen as new and unique. 4°
The dissenters on this point, constituting a majority of the Justices, would
41
have employed strict scrutiny. A demanding level of judicial review was
utilized nonetheless, but the possibility that the Court would depart from its
general analytical framework, by virtue of the special nature of the medium
of communication at issue, had arisen.
III. THE STATUTE
The two statutory provisions at issue, to be codified as sections 223(a)
and (d) of Title 47, came to be known as the "indecent transmission"
provision and the "patently offensive display" provision.4 3
The "indecent transmission" provision, section 223(a), made it a federal
crime, inter alia, to do the following acts, "knowingly," "in interstate or
foreign communications," "by means of a telecommunications device": to
create and initiate the transmission of any communication "which is obscene
or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18
years of age." 44
The "patently offensive" display provision, section 223(d), made it a
federal crime, inter alia, to do either of the following, "knowingly," "in
interstate or foreign communications," by use of an interactive computer
service:
to send to a specific person or persons under 18 years of age,
or... to display in a manner available to a person under 18 years
of age, "any... communication that, in context, depicts or
describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs ....
Significantly, two affirmative defenses were provided by the statute, in
section 223(e)(5), precluding conviction of a defendant who
"(A) has taken, in good faith, reasonable, effective, and
appropriate actions under the circumstances to restrict or prevent
40. Id. at 741-42.
41. Id. at 783 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting in part). See also id. at 832
(Thomas, J., dissenting in part).
42. Child Online Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (to be codified at
47 U.S.C. § 223(a), (d) (1998)).
43. Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2338 (1997).
44. Id. at 2338 (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(a) (Supp. 1997)).
45. See id. at 2338-39 (citing 47 U.S.C.A. § 223(d) (Supp. 1997)).
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access by minors to a [prohibited] communication... which may
involve any appropriate measures to restrict minors from such
communications, including any method which is feasible under
available technology; [sic] or
"(B) has restricted access to such communication by requiring
use of a verified credit card... or adult personal identification
number."46
IV. THE JUDICIAL REACTION TO THE CDA

A.

The Supreme Court Decisionin Reno
1. The Majority Opinion

Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for a majority of seven Justices,
affirming the decision of a three-judge District Court,4 7 invalidating these
provisions, excest to the extent that section 223(a) bars "obscene"
communications.
In the first three sections of his opinion, Stevens summarized the
district court's extensive findings of fact pertaining to sexually explicit
material on the Internet and available mechanisms for restricting access
of its enactment,50 and briefly
thereto,49 described the statute and the history
51
court.
lower
the
of
described the reasoning
a.

Key Findingsof Fact

Some of the District Court's important findings of fact, restated in Part I
of Justice Stevens' opinion, deserve restatement at this point.
Concerning sexually explicit material on the Internet, Stevens, quoting
in part from the findings below, wrote:
Though such material is widely available, users seldom encounter
such content accidentally.... Almost all sexually explicit images
are preceded by warnings as to the content. For that reason, "odds

46. Id. at 2339 n.26.
47. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
48. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2350.
49. Id. at 2334-37.
50. Id. at 2337-39.
51. Id. at 2339-41.
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are slim" that a user would enter a sexually explicit site by
accident. Unlike communications received by radio or television,
"the receipt of information on the Internet requires a series of
affirmative steps more deliberate and directed than merely turning
a dial. A child requires some sophistication and some ability to
read to retrieve
material and thereby to use the Internet
52
unattended."
Concerning age verification, again quoting in part from the findings
below, he wrote this:
The District Court categorically determined that there "is no
effective way to determine the identity or the age of a user who is
accessing material through e-mail, mail exploders, newsgroups or
chat rooms." The Government offered no evidence that there was a
reliable way to screen recipients and participants in such fora for
age.

Technology exists by which an operator of a Web site may
condition access on the verification of requested information such
as a credit card number or an adult password. Credit card
verification is only feasible, however, either in connection with a
commercial transaction ....For that reason .... credit card
verification was "effectively unavailable to a substantial number of
Internet content providers." . . . Moreover, the imposition of such a
requirement "would completely bar adults who do not have a credit
card and lack the resources to obtain one from accessing any
blocked material."
...[T]he District Court found that an adult password
requirement would impose significant burdens on noncommercial
sites, both because they would discourage users from accessing
their sites and because the cost of creating and maintaining such
screening systems would be "beyond their reach."

"Even if credit card verification or adult password verification
were implemented, the Government presented no testimony as to
52. Id. at 2336 (quoting ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844-45 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
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how such systems could ensure that the user of the password or
credit card is in fact over 18. The burdens imposed by credit card
verification and adult password verification systems make them
effectively 53
unavailable to a substantial number of Internet content
providers."

b.

Legal Analysis

Justice Stevens began his analysis of the constitutionality of the CDA in
Part IV of his opinion. However, instead of beginning by identifying the
statute as content based, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, he began by
addressing the government's argument "that the CDA is plainly
constitutional under three of our prior decisions," 54 Ginsberg v. New York, 5
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,56 5 7and a clearly inapplicable case, City of
Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.
Stevens distinguished Ginsberg on several grounds, including: 1)
Ginsberg involved a law that barred sales to minors, but not to adults;58 2)
"the New York statute applied only to commercial transactions[;] ' 59 and 3)
the forbidden material in Ginsberg,unlike the material prohibited under the
CDA, was defined in part' 6by
the absence of "serious literary, artistic,
°
political, or scientific value."
Pacifica was distinguishable on a variety of grounds as well, including
the observation-foreshadowed by Stevens' summary of the district court's
findings of fact-that, in contrast to the radio broadcast in Pacifica,"the risk
of encountering indecent material [on the Internet] by accident is remote
because a series of affirmative steps is required to access specific
material. '6
In Part V of his opinion, Stevens considered, in essence, whether the
constitutional analysis in the case should be affected by the nature of the

53. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2336-37 (quoting ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 844-47 (E.D. Pa.
1996)).
54. Id. at 2341.
55. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
56. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
57. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The Court in Playtime Theatres, Inc. divined a theory which
allowed it to treat what appeared to be a content based regulation of speech as if it were
content neutral. Id. at 47-49. By contrast, said Stevens, quite accurately, "the CDA is a
content-based blanket restriction on speech." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2342.
58. Id. at 2341.
59. Id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 647 (1968)).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 2342.
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communications medium involved. 62 The primary point of comparison, of
course, was broadcasting, long deemed to be subject to greater regulation
because of the "scarcity of available frequencies" and the "invasive nature"
of radio and television.6 3 "Those factors are not present in cyberspace,"6
wrote Stevens, who went on to conclude there was "no basis for qualifying
the level 65of First Amendment scrutiny that should be applied to this
medium.,
In Part VI of his opinion, Stevens toyed with the arguable vagueness of
the statutory provisions at issue, but stopped short of relying on that
vagueness as a basis, under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment,
for invalidating the statute. 66 He began by noting the "ambiguities" in the
challenged provisions-namely,
the word "indecent" and the phrase
"patently offensive."' 67 In the discussion that followed, he actually seemed to
have regarded these words as "vague," yet, again, did not rest his decision on
that basis. 68 Notably, he devoted little time to the word "indecent," focusing
instead on the phrase "patently offensive," and rejecting the government's
contention that that phrase could not be unconstitutionally vague because it
constitutes ' one
part of the Court's own three-part definition of unprotected
"obscenity. '69
But if the vagueness of these terms was not reason, in and of itself, to
strike down the CDA, what was the significance of these observations?
Early in this discussion, referring to the "uncertainty" that the CDA would
create, Stevens stated that "[t]his uncertainty undermines the likelihood that
the CDA has been carefully tailored to the congressional goal of protecting
minors from potentially harmful materials., 70 For this proposition he cited
no precedent, and, indeed, this author can think of no prior decision that
made this kind of connection between the problem of vagueness and the
requirement, under strict scrutiny, that a law be narrowly tailored to
accomplish the legislative goal. At the end of this section of his opinion,
Stevens said:

62. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2343.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2344.
66. Id. "Regardless of whether the CDA is so vague that it violates the Fifth
Amendment," he wrote, "the many ambiguities concerning the scope of its coverage render it
problematic for purposes of the First Amendment." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2344.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 2344-48.
69. Id. at 2345 (discussing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973)).
70. Id. at 2344.
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Given the vague contours of the coverage of the statute, it
unquestionably silences some speakers whose messages would be
entitled to constitutional protection. That danger provides further
reason for insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The
CDA's burden on protected speech cannot be
71 justified if it could be
avoided by a more carefully drafted statute.
But one would have expected the Court to have endorsed the latter
proposition in any event, and to have "insist[ed] that the statute not be overly
broad" regardless of any problems of vagueness.72 Arguably, then, this
discussion of vagueness contributed nothing to the Court's resolution of the
case. But it suggests that the terminology at issue, if used in future
legislation, might be deemed intolerably vague, even if Congress somehow
found a way to overcome the defects that did lead the Court to invalidate the
CDA.
Part VII of Justice Stevens' opinion contained the heart of his strict
scrutiny analysis, and it is to this part of his opinion that one must look to
determine, as best one can, precisely what was wrong, constitutionally, with
the CDA.
"[W]e have repeatedly recognized," he wrote, "the governmental
interest in protecting children from harmful materials." 73 That apparently
meant that the government's goal was of sufficient importance to satisfy
strict scrutiny; Stevens didn't say that explicitly, but the Court had
previously so stated.74
The problem, then, in general terms, was that the statute was not
sufficiently narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny. But why not? Here
are the key passages from this part of Stevens' opinion:
In order to deny minors access to potentially harmful speech, the
CDA effectively suppresses a large amount of speech that adults
have a constitutional right to receive and to address to one another.
That burden on adult speech is unacceptable if less restrictive

71. Id. at 2346.
72. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
73. Id.
74. Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989). See also text
accompanying notes 8, 35. Precisely what harm would likely befall children as a result of
exposure to non-obscene sexually explicit materials has never been identified by the Supreme
Court. But see the discussion of this point in the Report of the House Committee on
Commerce on the Child Online Protection Act, H.R. REP. No. 105-775 (1998), 1998 WL
691067 at 27-28.
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alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the
legitimate purpose that the statute was enacted to serve.75
The government interest in protecting children, he continued, "does not
justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults. As
we have explained, the Government may not
'[reduce] the adult
' 76
population.., to ...only what is fit for children.'
The last sentence quoted represents, of course, the principle of the
Butler case. But the preceding sentences appear, in and of themselves, to
treat the Butler principle as something other than absolute; the burden on
adult speech, it is said, is unacceptable ifless restrictive alternatives would
do the job as well. Because, under strict scrutiny, any burden on speech is
unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would do the job as well, the
reference to the Butler principle arguably becomes superfluous.
At this point Stevens detoured slightly from his statement of governing
principles, taking time to explain why communication between adults was
burdened by the CDA:
Given the size of the potential audience for most messages, in the
absence of a viable age verification process, the sender must be
charged with knowing that one or more minors will likely view it.
Knowledge that, for instance, one or more members of a 100person chat group will be minor-and therefore that it would be a
crime to send the group an indecent
message-would surely burden
77
communication among adults.
As noted previously, the district court had found that existing technology did
not include any effective method for a sender to prevent minors from
obtaining access to its Internet communications without also denying access
to adults, and that the use of age verification devices would prove quite
burdensome for many speakers.78 Thus,
79 the CDA would significantly burden
adult communication on the Internet.
Stevens continued, in characteristically unstructured fashion:

75. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2346.
76. Id. (quoting Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989)).
77. Id. at 2347.
78. Id. at 2336-37.
79. At that point, Stevens added this: "By contrast, the District Court found
that... currently available user-based software suggests that a reasonably effective method
by which parents can prevent their children accessing sexually explicit ...material... will
soon be widely available." Id. at 2347 (quoting ACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 842 (E.D. Pa.
1996)). The legal relevance of that observation is far from clear.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss2/6

12

Rohr: Can Congress Regulate "Indecent" Speech on the Internet?

1999]

Rohr

The

breadth

of

the

CDA's

coverage

is

wholly

unprecedented.... [T]he scope of the CDA is not limited to
commercial speech or commercial entities. . . .The general,

undefined terms "indecent" and "patently offensive" cover large
amounts of nonpornographic material with serious educational or
other value.
Moreover, the "community
standards"
criterion... means that any communication available to a nationwide audience will be judged by the standards of the community
most likely to be offended by the message.80
The regulated subject matter, he went on to say, might "extend to
discussions about prison rape or safe sexual practices, artistic images that
include nude subjects, and arguably the card catalogue of the Carnegie
Library. 8 s
Stevens then invoked the government's argument that, in effect, the
First Amendment surely does not protect the communication of all
"indecent" or "patently offensive" messages to minors, regardless of whether
the message contains "value."8 2 The Court "need neither accept nor reject"
that argument, said Stevens.8 3 "It is at least clear," he continued, "that the
strength of the Government's interest in protecting minors is not equally
strong throughout the coverage of this broad statute."' 4 He hypothesized
further at this point: "[A] parent who sent his 17-year-old college freshman
information on birth control via e-mail could be incarcerated even though
neither he, his child, nor anyone in their home community, found the
material 'indecent' 85or 'patently offensive', if the college town's community
thought otherwise.
Was the problem, then, that Congress had gone too far by shielding
minors even from sex-related communication that contained serious artistic
or educational value? Was the law overinclusive, to that extent, because
such material does not give rise to the harms that Congress has a compelling
interest in preventing? If that is what Justice Stevens was thinking, he did
not say it.
Was there a particular constitutional infirmity stemming from the fact
that "indecency" might be determined through the prism of the "community
standards" of a distant, or nationwide, "community?" Stevens didn't say

80. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2347.
81. Id. at 2348.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
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that, either, nor has case law in the obscenity
context suggested that such an
86
approach raises constitutional problems.
Instead of expressly basing the Court's ruling on any or all of those
concerns, Stevens concluded this key section of his opinion with the
following paragraph:
The breadth of this content based restriction of speech imposes an
especially heavy burden on the Government to explain why a less
restrictive provision would not be as effective as the CDA. It has
not done so. The arguments in this Court have referred to possible
alternatives such as requiring that indecent material be "tagged" in
a way that facilitates parental control of material coming into their
homes, making exceptions for messages with artistic or educational
value, providing some tolerance for parental choice, and regulating
some portions of the Internet-such as commercial web sitesdifferently than others, such as chat rooms.
Was Stevens saying here that less restrictive alternatives existed? Or
merely that "possible alternatives" existed, which is to say that the existence
of such alternatives was possible, but not certain? If the latter, was the
constitutional infirmity a procedural problem of sorts-namely, that the
government had simply not satisfied its burden of proving that no less
restrictive alternatives existed? If so, was that a fair conclusion? Did any
such less restrictive alternatives exist? Did Stevens identify any, in the
language just quoted? Bearing in mind that a less restrictive alternative must
be employed when it will accomplish the government's goal at least as well
as the challenged
regulation,
9~~88,, can that be said ••of the "tagging"
, alternative to
which Stevens referred? Of the other "possible alternatives" he cited, how
could it be said that: (a) "making exceptions for messages with artistic or
educational value; ' 89 or (b) regulating only "commercial" web sites, 9° would
fully achieve the government's goal?
The final sentence of this apparently dispositive paragraph was this:
"Particularly in the light of the absence of any detailed findings by the
Congress, or even hearings addressing the special problems of the CDA, we
are persuaded that the CDA is not narrowly tailored if that requirement has
any meaning at all." 9' A failure by Congress to utilize less restrictive
86. See United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
87. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
88. See Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957); infra comments in note 129 and
accompanying text.
89. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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available alternatives would lead to the conclusion that the statute was not
sufficiently narrowly tailored, which in turn would render the statute
unconstitutional. But why the sudden and unexpected reference to the
absence of Congressional findings or hearings? 92 Is Congress obliged to
make findings, or to hold hearings, when it legislates in a manner that affects
freedom of expression, or was the apparently hasty and spontaneous nature
of the enactment of this statute simply an aggravating factor in the minds of
the Justices? 93
In Part IX of his opinion, Justice Stevens responded to, and rejected, the
government's argument that the statute was constitutional by virtue of the
affirmative defenses provided therein:
First, relying on the "good faith, reasonable, effective and
appropriate actions" provision, the Government suggests that
"tagging" provides a defense that saves the constitutionality of the
Act. The suggestion assumes that transmitters may encode their
indecent communications in a way that would indicate their
contents, thus permitting recipients to block their reception with
appropriate software. It is the requirement that the good faith
action must be "effective" that makes this defense illusory. The
Government recognizes that its proposed screening software does
not currently exist. Even if it did, there is no way to know whether
a potential recipient will actually block the encoded material.
Without the impossible knowledge that every guardian in America
is screening for the "tag," the 94transmitter could not reasonably rely
on its action to be "effective."
As to the other affirmative defense, applicable when a transmitter
restricts access by requiring the use of a verified credit card or adult
identification, Stevens returned to the finding of the district court that "it is
not economically feasible for most noncommercial speakers to employ such
verification" techniques; "[a]ccordingly, this defense would not significantly
narrow the statute's burden on noncommercial speech." 95 Additionally, the
government "failed to adduce any evidence that these verification techniques
92. Earlier in his opinion, Justice Stevens briefly described the process by which the
CDA had been enacted, observing that "[n]o hearings were held on the provisions that became
law." Id. at 2338 n.24.
93. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 549 (1995), in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, commented on the absence of congressional findings, in
the course of striking down a federal statute on the ground that the subject of the regulation
did not have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. Id.
94. Reno, 117 S.Ct. at 2349.

95. Id.
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actually preclude minors from posing as adults. 96 Thus, an "unacceptably
heavy burden" on adult speech remained, and "the defenses do not constitute
the sort of "narrowly tailoring" that will save an otherwise patently invalid
unconstitutional provision." 97 But did not Justice Stevens' pronouncements
concerning the inefficacy of these defenses tend to discredit his earlier
suggestion that Congress had not employed the least restrictive means of
achieving its goals?
2. The Concurring Opinion
The only other opinion written by any of the Justices in this case was
that written by Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, partly
dissenting and partly concurring in the judgment.98 O'Connor began by
stating that she viewed the CDA "as little more than an attempt by Congress
to create 'adult zones' on the Internet." 99 She then proceeded to set down
the following governing principles (which apparently exist, for her, outside
of any structured strict-scrutiny analysis):
The Court has previously sustained such zoning laws, but only if
they respect the First Amendment rights of adults and minors. That
is to say, a zoning law is valid if (i) it does not unduly restrict adult
access to the material; and (ii) minors have
1°° no First Amendment
right to read or view the banned material.
11
For this proposition she relied on the holdings in Butler v. Michigan, 0
Sable Communications v. FCC,10 2 and Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products
1
1°4 which upheld a statute
Corp,
3 and distinguished Ginsberg v. New York,
that
in no
way curtailed adult access to sexually explicit
material.10 5

96. Id.
97. Id. at 2350.
98. Id. at 2351 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). O'Connor's
partial dissent was based on her view that the "indecen[t] transmission" provision and the
"specific person" provision were constitutional, to the extent that they applied to Internet
communications "where the party initiating the communication knows that all of the recipients
are minors." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
99. Id. at 2351.
100. Id. at 2352-53.

101.
102.
103.
104.

352 U.S. 380 (1957).
492 U.S. 115 (1989).
463 U.S. 60 (1983).
390 U.S. 629 (1968).

105. Id. at 673-75.
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O'Connor then ruminated a bit on the nature of "zoning" in
cyberspace-via "gateway technology," (e.g., screening software)-and
ultimately concluded: "Gateway technology is not ubiquitous in cyberspace,
and because without it 'there is no means of age verification,' cyberspace
still remains largely unzoned-and unzoneable." °6 "Although the prospects
for the eventual zoning of the Internet appear promising," she continued,
"we must evaluate the constitutionality of the CDA as it applies to the
Internet as it exists today."' 0 7 Given present conditions, she concluded, the
"display" provision was unconstitutional, because its prohibition would
"[impinge] on the First Amendment right of adults to make and obtain this
speech and, for all intents and purposes, '[reduce] the adult population [on
the Internet] to reading only what is fit for children.' 1 0s... As a result, the
'display' provision cannot withstand scrutiny."'1 9 For her, then, it appears
that the Butler principle controlled, independently of any other mode of First
Amendment analysis.
Returning to her two-part inquiry, stated above, O'Connor then
considered "[w]hether the CDA substantially interferes with the First
Amendment rights of minors."1 0 Her response was that it did not, but that
was because of the established rule that, for a statute to be stricken as
facially overbroad under the First Amendment, it had to be substantially
overbroad."' She did not deem the CDA to be substantially overbroad, but
did seem to think that it did violate the First Amendment rights of minors in
some of its applications." 2 In this analysis she was guided by the case of
Ginsberg v. New York," 3 which "established that minors may
constitutionally be denied access to material that is obscene as to minors."' 4
She explained:
Because the CDA denies minors the right to obtain material that is
"patently offensive"-even if it has some redeeming value for
minors and even if it does not appeal to their prurient interestsCongress' rejection of the Ginsberg "harmful to minors" standard

106. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2354 (O'Connor, J.,concurring in part, dissenting in part)
(quotingACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 846 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
107. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
108. Id.
109. Id. (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)).
110. Id. (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973)).
111. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
112. Id.
113. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
114. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2356 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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means that the CDA could ban some speech that is 'indecent'
15 (i.e.,
"patently offensive") but that is not obscene as to minors."'
But, again, the CDA was not, in her view, substantially overbroad in
this regard: "In my view, the universe of speech constitutionally protected
as to minors but banned by the CDA-i.e., the universe of material that is
'patently offensive,' but which nonetheless has some redeeming value for
16
minors or does not appeal to their prurient interest-is a very small one."'
While this discussion did not affect the way in which these two Justices
would have disposed of this case, it did reveal their belief that even minors
have a First Amendment right to offensive, sexually explicit material when
that material "has some redeeming value for minors.
If other Justices
were to join them in taking this position (as seems likely, considering that
O'Connor was joined in this opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist), it would
serve as an additional limitation on the ability of Congress to regulate speech
deemed harmful to minors.
B.

The Lower CourtDecisions
1. ACLU v. Reno

While it is the Supreme Court decision that counts, the opinions written
by each of the judges of the special three-judge court that initially decided
the case of ACLU v. Reno,18 may nonetheless shed additional light on the
possible judicial response to any future variations of the CDA that may
emerge from Congress. Those opinions foreshadowed Justice Stevens'
reasoning to a considerable extent, but contained some additional analytical
reactions to the CDA that were not addressed, and certainly not discredited,
by the Supreme Court decision. Thus, even if Congress could cure every
defect identified by Justice Stevens, a new statutory regulation of Internet
speech might yet run afoul of a principle put forth in one of these three

115. Id.
116. Id. Justice O'Connor clarified the role of "value" in this context, as follows:
minors do not enjoy a right to all material having "value," rather, "under Ginsberg, minors
only have a First Amendment right to obtain patently offensive material that has 'redeeming
social importance for minors."' Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633
(1968)).
117. Id.
118. 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996). Following an introduction, findings of fact,
and a brief statement of conclusions of law, each of the three judges wrote an opinion
representing only his own views. Id. at 824.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss2/6

18

Rohr: Can Congress Regulate "Indecent" Speech on the Internet?

1999]

Rohr

opinions. Those additional bases for striking down the CDA should thus be
explored.
Chief Judge Sloviter took a bit of time questioning whether the
government had a compelling interest "in regulating the vast range of online
material covered or potentially covered by the CDA!' 1 9-in other words,
whether the government truly had a compellinkmnterest with respect to the full
range of the CDA's potential applications.
This approach appears to
confuse the question of whether the government's goal is one of compelling
importance with the separate question of whether the statute is narrowly
tailored to accomplish that goal. Still, a distinguished federal judge made this
argument,
although he disclaimed reliance upon it in striking down the
121
statute.
In addition, Judge Sloviter made observations that, in effect, give
substance to an argument, though not explicitly offered as such, that the
CDA was not necessaryto achieve the government's purposes:
Minors would not be left without any protection from exposure to
patently unsuitable material on the Internet should the challenged
provisions of the CDA be preliminarily enjoined. Vigorous
enforcement of current obscenity and child pornography laws
should suffice to address the problem the government identified in
court and which concerned Congress. When the CDA was under
consideration by Congress, the Justice Department itself
communicated its view that it was not necessary because it was
prosecuting online obscenity, child pornography and child
solicitation under existing laws, and would continue to do so.12

119. Id. at 853 (Sloviter, C.J.).
120. Chief Judge Sloviter concluded, for example, that "where non-pornographic, albeit
sexually explicit, material also falls within the sweep of the statute, the interest will not be as
compelling." Id. at 852 (Sloviter, C.J.).
121. This point found fleeting expression in Justice Stevens' opinion as well, when he
remarked that "the strength of the Government's interest in protecting minors is not equally
strong throughout the coverage of this broad statute." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2348.
122. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 856-57 (Sloviter, C.J.). The existence and applicability of
federal obscenity and child pornography laws were noted by Justice Stevens only in a
footnote, accompanied by the observation that "when Congress was considering the CDA, the
Government expressed its view that the law was unnecessary because existing laws already
authorized its ongoing efforts to prosecute obscenity, child pornography, and child
solicitation." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2347 n. 44. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1464-65, 2251, 2422(b)
(West Supp. 1998).
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Judge Buckwalter, writing separately, concluded that the words
"indecent" and "patently offensive" were unconstitutionally vague.12 3 With
respect to the word "indecent," he did not regard the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Pacifica as having precluded such an argument.124 He
was troubled, as well, by the ambiguity attendant upon the statutory
reference to "community standards." 125
Judge Dalzell, the third member of the court, concluded his lengthy
opinion with this observation, bearing upon the inevitable ineffectuality of
the congressional act: "Moreover, the CDA will almost certainly fail to
accomplish the Government's interest in shielding children from
pornography on the Internet. Nearly half of Internet communications
States, and some percentage of that figure
originate outside the United
126
represents pornography.
2. Shea v. Reno
In Shea v. Reno,127 the other 1996 decision of a three-judge court
striking down the CDA, the court, whose holding was based on reasoning
that anticipated that of Justice Stevens to a great extent, made a comment
similar to that made by Judge Dalzell regarding the likely ineffectiveness of
the statute:
It is ...unnecessary, given our holding .... to decide whether the
potential ineffectiveness of the CDA in eradicating the problem of
minors' having access to sexually explicit material on the Internet
renders the statute constitutionally defective. Because the CDA
only regulates content providers within the United States, while
perhaps as much as thirty percent of the sexually explicit material
on the Internet originates abroad . . ., the CDA will not reach a
significant percentage of the sexually explicit material currently
available.... [T]he apparent ineffectiveness of the CDA
underscores our holding today that the Government has failed to
123. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 858. Judge Sloviter indicated that he agreed with Judge
Buckwalter on this point. Id. at 856 (Sloviter, C.J.).
124. Id. at 862. See Reno, 117 S.Ct. 2329, 2342. Judge Dalzell, in his supporting
opinion, disagreed with Judge Buckwalter on this point. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 868-69
(Dalzell, J.).
125. Id. at 863 (Buckwalter, J.).
126. Id. at 882 (Dalzell, J.). This, too, was a point acknowledged by Justice Stevens
only in a footnote, as follows: "Because so much sexually explicit content originates overseas,
[appellees] argue, the CDA cannot be 'effective.' . . . We find it unnecessary to address those
issues to dispose of this case." Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2347-48 n.45.
127. 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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demonstrate that the CDA does not "unnecessarily interfer[e] with
First Amendment freedoms." 12s

This court made a link, it seems, between the ineffectiveness of the
statute and the requirement that a content based regulation be "necessary" to
the accomplishment of a compelling state interest. If an argument of this
kind is taken seriously, it may well follow that no regulation of Internet
speech can withstand First Amendment scrutiny.
V. WHAT DOES THE CDA LITIGATION SUGGEST, WITH REGARD TO THE
VALIDITY OF FUTURE LEGISLATION?

The United States Supreme Court decision in Reno makes clear that the
Courts' formal response to content based regulation of speech on the Internet
will be strict judicial scrutiny. Again, that means that the government's goal
must be a very important one-apparently not a problem when government
seeks to protect children from emotional and psychological harm-and that
any such regulation must be necessary to the achievement of that goal, and
narrowly tailored to do so, regulating no more, and no less, than is required
to accomplish the purpose. In addition, the law must represent the least
speech-restrictive means of achieving the government's goal.
Can any regulation of speech on the Internet pass that test?
While the Stevens opinion in Reno purported to find the CDA
inadequately tailored to the achievement of its goal, and, more specifically,
to have failed to satisfy the "least restrictive means" requirement of strict
scrutiny, his opinion is quite unclear as to why those conclusions were
reached. Indeed, as noted earlier, there appear to be no less restrictive ways
in which Congress might just as effectively achieve the goal of shielding
minors from sexually explicit online communications. The Court's unpersuasive use of strict scrutiny makes it harder to evaluate the validity of
prospective future legislative initiatives of this kind-but the fact that the
United States Supreme Court said what it did will tend to lead lower courts,
in future cases, to effectively presume that a regulation of this kind fails
strict scrutiny, and perhaps to engage in similarly conclusory analyses.
Arguments flowing from the requirements of strict scrutiny that might
provide more satisfying bases for striking down such a regulation, however,
include the following: 1) such a regulation is unnecessary, because existing
federal statutes already prohibit those communications, online or elsewhere,
that pose the greatest risks to the emotional and psychological well-being of
minors; 2) such a regulation is inescapably and fatally underinclusive (and
thus not narrowly tailored to achieve its goal), because sexually explicit
128. Id. at 941.
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communications emanating from foreign sources effectively cannot and will
not be banned by American legislation; and 3) for the same reason, such a
regulation cannot be effective in achieving its goal.
But the real meaning of the Reno decision may have nothing to do with
the well-established "strict scrutiny" analysis. Instead, the decision may
simply (although not unambiguously) make clear, forty years after the
United States Supreme Court originally set forth this principle in Butler v.
Michigan," 9 that government really may not, consistently with the First
Amendment, shield minors from speech deemed harmful to them, but which
is protected speech with respect to adults, by means of a regulatory
scheme-even one limited to a specific medium of communication-that
effectively deprives adults of access to that speech via that medium. If that
is what Reno stands for, then no CDA-type regulation, taking the form of a
blanket prohibition of speech deemed harmful to minors, will stand.
If that is indeed the key to Reno, then none of the more detailed
grievances lurking in Stevens' opinion-including, most notably, the fact
that the speech banned by the CDA was not defined by the absence of
"value" 1(serious or otherwise)-should have any legal significance. Nonobscene material lacking "value" would, after all, still be protected speech
with respect to adults. Likewise, the arguable vagueness of statutory terms
such as "indecency" probably drops out of the analysis, in effect, because the
Butler principle invalidates even a blanket prohibition that could survive a
vagueness challenge.
But what is to be made of Stevens' observation that the CDA was not
limited, in its application, to "commercial" websites?131 Is there any good
reason to believe that a CDA-like statute limited to commercial websites
would be constitutional? That would narrow the reach of the regulation, and
commensurately reduce-but not eliminate-the burden placed upon
protected speech.
The Butler principle would not, however, prevent Congress from
imposing upon online communicators an affirmative obligation to take
specified steps designed to minimize the likelihood that minors would come
into contact with sexually explicit communications. And that is what
Congress has done, in the wake of the failure of the CDA.

129. 352 U.S. 380 (1957). The Court reiterated the Butler principle in other decisions,
most notably in Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126-27
(1989), and in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod.Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 73 (1983), during the 1980s,
but none of those decisions depended on that principle.
130. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341, 2344 n.37, 2349.
131. Id. at 2347.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol23/iss2/6

22

Rohr: Can Congress Regulate "Indecent" Speech on the Internet?

1999]

Rohr

VI. THE CHILD ONLINE PROTECTION ACr
Congress enacted the Child Online Protection Act132 ("COPA") on
October 21, 1998. In assessing the constitutionality of the Act, it is useful to
first consider two prior versions of the bill that ultimately became law.
When initially introduced in the House of Representatives on April 30,
1998, the Child Online Protection Act contained the following core
provision: "Whoever in interstate or foreign commerce is engaged in the
business of selling or transferring, by means of the World Wide Web,
material that is harmful to minors shall restrict access to such material by
persons under 17 years of age. ' 33
Criminal penalties were provided in the event of violations. The bill
went on to provide that one would not be liable if one restricted access to
said material "by requiring use of a verified credit card, debit account, adult
access code, or adult personal identification number[, or in accordance with
such other procedures as the [FCC] may prescribe)."' 3 The phrase "harmful
to minors" was defined in a manner quite comparable to the definition, in the
135
New York statute upheld by the Supreme Court in Ginsberg v. New York,
of material which was deemed obscene as to minors, and which could not
legally be sold to minors. 36
Would this bill, if enacted, have survived strict constitutional scrutiny?
Unless the Supreme Court repudiates the definition that even Justice
Brennan found to be acceptable thirty years ago in Ginsberg, there appears
to be no problem with respect to the scope of the targeted communications.
Moreover, the concerns (of uncertain magnitude) expressed in Reno with
regard to: (a) the CDA's inclusion of material with "value,"' 137 and (b)the
CDA's applicability to non-commercial sources of communications,"' are
here eliminated. Furthermore, the wording of this bill imposed an
affirmative obligation on those sources-to "restrict access"-rather than a
prohibition of the targeted communications.139 Culpability would thus not
have been imposed on communicators who are helpless to avoid making
online communications accessible to minors, other than by censoring their
communications to adults-the apparent primary vice of the CDA. Rather,
one would be culpable only for failing to utilize existing screening devices.
If one did utilize such devices, guilt would not be imposed simply because
132. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1998)).
133. H.R. 3783, 105th Cong. § 3 (1998).

134. Id.
135. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
136. Id.
137. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2341,2344 n.37, 2349.
138. Id. at 2347.
139. Id. at 2339.
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some minors gained access to the targeted communications. Thus, Reno's
concern with the illusoriness of the CDA's affirmative defenses would
apparently play no role in an evaluation of this bill. While this bill might
still have been found to be unconstitutional, these points of distinction from
the CDA would have bolstered its chances of surviving a First Amendment
challenge.
However, by the time this bill emerged from the House Committee on
Commerce in early October, its core provision had been significantly
modified to read as follows:
(a) Requirement to Restrict Access.(1) Prohibited conduct.-Whoever, in interstate or foreign
commerce, by means of the World Wide Web, knowingly makes
any communication for commercial purposes that includes any
material that is harmful to minors, without restricting access to such
to subsection (c), shall be fined ...
materials by minors pursuant
140
imprisoned.... or both.
Subsection (c) provided an affirmative defense, comparable to that in the
original bill, that would preclude liability on the part of a defendant who
41
took appropriate steps to restrict access by minors to "harmful" material.
The core provision of the bill had thus been transformed from a requirement
that access be restricted to a ban on certain communications, unless access
were restricted. The language of this provision evolved further during the
month of October. The key language of the statute, as it was enacted, is as
follows:
SEC. 231. RESTRICTION OF ACCESS BY MINORS TO
MATERIALS COMMERCIALLY DISTRIBUTED BY MEANS
OF WORLD WIDE WEB THAT ARE HARMFUL TO MINORS.
"(a) REQUIREMENT TO RESTRICT ACCESS."(1) PROHIBITED CONDUCT.-Whoever knowingly and
with knowledge of the character of the material, in interstate or
foreign commerce by means of the World Wide Web, makes any
communication for commercial purposes that is available to any
minor and that includes any material that is harmful to minors shall

140. H. R.
141. Id.

REP.

No. 105-775, 105th Cong. (1998), 1998 WL 691067 at *4-5.
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be fined not more than $50,000, imprisoned not more than 6
months, or both.1 42
"(c) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE."(1) DEFENSE.-It is an affirmative defense to
prosecution under this section that the defendant, in good faith, has
restricted access by minors to material that is harmful to minors(A) by requiring use of a credit card, debit account,
adult access code, or adult personal identification number;
(B) by accepting a digital certificate that verifies age;
or
reasonable measures that are feasible
(C) by any other
143
under available technology.
(e) DEFINITIONS.-For purposes of this subsection, the
following definitions shall apply:
"(6) MATERIAL THAT IS HARMFUL TO MINORS.The term "material that is harmful to minors" means any
communication, picture, image, graphic image file, article,
recording, writing, or other matter of any kind that is obscene or
that"(A) the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, would find, taking the material as a whole
and with respect to minors, is designed to appeal to, or is designed
to pander to, the prurient interest;
"(B) depicts, describes, or represents, in a manner
patently offensive with respect to minors, an actual or simulated
sexual act or sexual contact, an actual or simulated normal or
perverted sexual act, or a lewd exhibition of the genitals or postpubescent female breast; and
"(C) taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value for minors.
term 'minor' means any person under
"(7) MINOR.-The
144
17 years of age.

142. COPA, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. §
231(a)(1) (1998)).
143. Id. (to be codified at47 U.S.C. § 231(c)(1)).
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The statute also created a Commission on Online Child Protection, "for
the purpose of conducting a study... regarding methods to help reduce
145
access by minors to material that is harmful to minors on the Internet."
As enacted, then, the COPA is no longer susceptible to being read as
merely requiring that Internet content providers take certain prescribed steps
to restrict access by minors to "harmful" material. Rather, like the CDA, it
prohibits certain speech on the Internet, but provides that the use of
prescribed methods of restricting access shall constitute an affirmative
defense to liability. Thus, the resemblance between the COPA and the CDA
is greater than we had been led to anticipate.
Still, there are significant differences between the CDA and the COPA.
As has already been noted, those differences include: 1) a redefinition of
the targeted communications that is probably constitutionally acceptable;
and 2) a limitation of the scope of the targeted communications to those
communicated: a) "by means of the World Wide Web;
and b) "for
commercial purposes." 147 Moreover, a "minor" is now defined as a person
under seventeen years of age,148 a year younger than a minor protected by the
CDA.149 In addition, and very significantly, there is no requirement in the
COPA, as there was in the CDA, that a method of restricting access by
minors must, in order to serve as an affirmative defense, be "effective."
Recall that, in Reno, Justice Stevens stated that "[i]t is the requirement that
the good faith action must be 'effective' that makes this defense illusory."' 150
Presumably, the elimination of that flaw greatly enhances the prospect that
the COPA will survive a First Amendment challenge. Note also that, for
whatever it may be worth, Congress did a better job "procedurally," this time
around, than it had in laying a satisfactory predicate for the ill-fated
CDA. Both houses of Congress, during 1998, held hearings pertaining to the
subject of this legislation, and, in its Report, the House Committee on

144. Id. (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 232(e)(6)-(7) (1998)). Also defined in section
(e), most notably, are the phrases "by means of the World Wide Web" and "commercial
purposes." Id.
145. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (to be codified at __ U.S.C. __ (1998)).
146. This limitation is given emphasis in the House Report, which observed that the
statute "does not apply to content distributed through other aspects of the Internet such as oneto-one messaging (e-mail), one-to-many messaging (list-serv), distributed message databases
(USENET newsgroups); real time communications (Internet relay chat); real time remote
utilization (telnet) or remote information retrieval other than the World Wide Web (ftp and
gopher)." H. R. REP. No. 105-775 (1998), 1998 WL 691067 at *30.

147. Id.
148. Id. at *31.
149. See supra text accompanying note 3.
150. Reno, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 2349 (1997).
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Commerce set forth pertinent findings of fact with respect to both
1 51the need
for regulation and the absence of sufficient regulatory alternatives.
The COPA, then, is a more limited interference with freedom of speech
than was the CDA. But is it nonetheless likely to fall to a First Amendment
challenge? The answer may hinge on the extent to which even a prohibition
that is limited to those web sites operated "for commercial purposes" is seen
as placing too great a burden on freedom of speech.1 52 The Supreme Court
in Reno made much of the burdens placed by the CDA on those
communicators who could not easily utilize available age verification
devices. 3 In that part of his opinion in which he reviewed the district
court's findings of fact, Justice Stevens observed that credit card verification
was only feasible in connection with commercial transactions; by contrast,
using that approach "would impose costs on non-commercial Web sites that
would require many of them to shut down."' 154 "Moreover," he went on to
say, "the imposition of such a requirement 'would completely bar adults who
do not have a credit card and lack the resources to obtain one from accessing
any blocked material."" 5 Later, in the core part of his analysis of the CDA,
Stevens noted that the district court had "found that it would be prohibitively
expensive for noncommercial-as well as some commercial-speakers who
have Web sites to verify that their users are adults.... These limitations
must inevitably curtail a significant amount of adult communication on the
Internet."' 56
Narrowing the reach of the statute to "commercial" providers thus goes
far toward reducing the extent to which online adult communications are
burdened, or suppressed, by a requirement that age verification devices be
employed. But Stevens' statement that "it would be prohibitively expensive
for... [even] some commercial.., speakers who have Web sites to verify
151. H. R. REP. No. 105-775 (1998), 1998 WL 691067 at *3-4. Note also that, in the
Congressional Findings that appear at the outset of the COPA itself, it is asserted that "(4) a
prohibition on the distribution of material harmful to minors, combined with legitimate
defenses, is currently the most effective and least restrictive means by which to satisfy the
compelling government interest ....

"

Id. at *4.

152. "The decision in ACLU suggests that the constitutionality of an Internet-based
'harmful-to-minors' statute likely would depend, principally, on how difficult and expensive it
would be for persons to comply with the statute without sacrificing their ability to convey
protected expression to adults and to minors." L. Anthony Sutin, Departmentof Justice Letter
on CDA II <http://www.aclu.org/court/acluvrenolldoj.letter.html>. (L. Anthony Sutin, as
Acting Assistant Attorney General, authored this letter dated October 5, 1998, to
Congressman Thomas Bliley, the Chairman of the Committee on Commerce, wherein he
outlined the Department's views on the COPA.).
153. Reno, 117 S. Ct. at 2337.
154. Id.
155. Id. (citingACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 846 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
156. Id. at 2347 (citingACLU, 929 F. Supp. 824, 845-48 (E.D. Pa. 1996)).
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that their users are adults, ' ' 57 if still factually accurate, suggests that even
this drastic narrowing of the field of regulatory targets may not suffice to
save the statute. The clear argument to be made by a challenger is that a
requirement that "prohibitively expensive" devices be employed amounts to
a prohibition of protected communications between adults, with respect to
those speakers for whom the devices are "prohibitively expensive." That
would seem to bring the Butler principle back into play.
A legal challenge to the COPA has, in fact, already been launched. The
ACLU, along with several other organizations, has filed a lawsuit seekingto
have the COPA declared unconstitutional and to enjoin its enforcement.
In its complaint, the ACLU attempts to demonstrate the breadth of the
coverage of the COPA, notwithstanding its limitation to web sites operated
"for commercial purposes:"
The Act purports to restrict only content provided on the Web "for
commercial purposes," but in fact it explicitly bans a wide range of
protected expression that is provided for free on the Internet by
individuals and organizations.... [T]he Act targets all other
communications made publicly accessible on the Web "for
commercial purposes," defined very broadly as being "engaged in
the business of making such communications."... The Act's
definition of a person "engaged in the business" explicitly states
that "it is not necessary that the person make a profit" nor that the
making of the communications be the person's "principal
business.". . . Just like many traditional print newspapers,
bookstores, and magazine publishers, many Web publishers make a
profit (or attempt to make a profit) through advertising.... Thus,
the Act impacts a wide range of providers of free content, from fine
159
art to popular magazines to news and issue-oriented expression.
The ACLU goes on, in its complaint, to contend that, for many of these
targeted online content providers, the methods of restricting access that give
rise to an affirmative defense'1under
the COPA are, in fact, "technologically
6
and economically infeasible." 0
157. Id. at 2347.
158. ACLU in Court: ACLU v. Reno Complaint <http://www.aclu.org/court/
acluvrenolI_complaint.html>. [hereinafter ACLU Complaint]. In November 1998, a federal
district judge issued a temporary restraining order, enjoining enforcement of the statute.
ACLU v. Reno, No. CIV.A.98-5591, 1998 WL 813423 at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 23, 1998). This
was followed by the entry of a preliminary injunction on February 1, 1999. ACLU v. Reno,
No. CIV.A.98-5591, 1999 WL 44852 at *27 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 1999).
159. See ACLU Complaint, supra note 158, 65.
160. See ACLU Complaint,supra note 158, H 67-69.
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The resolution of the constitutional question may, then, ultimately
depend on further empirical developments of a technological and economic
nature: are these means of restricting access to web sites technologically or
economically infeasible, "prohibitively expensive," or otherwise intolerably
burdensome? If they are feasible, and not prohibitively expensive, then the
COPA may be constitutional.
In issuing a preliminary injunction against the enforcement of the
COPA (and denying the government's motion to dismiss the complaint),
Judge Reed made extensive findings of fact concerning the costs of
compliance with the new statute, 161 leading him to conclude that "the
plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood that they will be able162
to
show that COPA imposes a burden on speech that is protected for adults."
Even if a significant amount of adult speech is burdened by the COPA,
does the Butler principle admit of any flexibility? Might the concededly
strong government interest, and the limited nature of the regulation, at some
point outweigh the fact that some online communications that are
constitutionally protected as to adults will not be permitted to be made? Of
course, if a court finds that the government could have achieved its goals
through less restrictive means, then the COPA will be struck down, just as
was the CDA. In his memorandum of February 1, 1999, Judge Reed
suggested that the case might be decided on that basis:
On the record to date, it is not apparent to this Court that the
defendant can meet its burden to prove that COPA is the least
restrictive means available to achieve the goal of restricting the
access of minors to this material.... The record before the Court
reveals that blocking or filtering technology may be at least as
successful as COPA would be in restricting minors' access to
harmful material online without imposing the burden on
constitutionally protected speech that COPA imposes on adult
users or Web site operators. Such a factual conclusion is at least
some evidence that COPA does not employ the least restrictive
means.163

The arguable defect in this reasoning is that, as Justice Stevens observed in
the process of invalidating the CDA, there is no assurance
that parents will
64
actually employ such blocking or filtering devices.1
161.
fact 41-64.
162.
163.
164.

See ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 488-92 (E.D. Pa.' 1999) for findings of
ACLU, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
Id. at 497.
See supra text accompanying note 94.
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More persuasively, however, Judge Reed went on to call attention to
"other aspects of COPA which Congress could have made less restrictive[:]"
Notably, the sweeping category of forms of content that are
prohibited--"any communication, picture, image, graphic image
file, article, recording, writing, or other matter of any kind"-could
have been less restrictive of speech on the Web and more narrowly
tailored to Congress' goal of shielding minors from pornographic
teasers if the prohibited forms of content had included, for
instance, only pictures, images, or graphic image files, which are
typically 165employed by adult entertainment Web sites as
"teasers."
Finally, if all other bases for a First Amendment challenge fail, would a
court invalidate this law simply because it cannot effectively rid the Internet
of all such "harmful" communications, particularly those that emanate from
abroad? Judge Reed made reference to this concern as well:
[T]his Court's finding that minors may be able to gain access to
harmful to minors materials on foreign Web sites, non-commercial
sites, and online via protocols other than http demonstrates the
problems this statute has with efficaciously meeting its goal.
Moreover, there is some indication in the record that minors may
be able to legitimately possess a credit or debit card and access
harmful to minors materials despite the screening mechanisms
provided in the affirmative defenses.... These factors reduce the
benefit that will be realized by the implementation of166COPA in
preventing minors from accessing such materials online.
These seem to be the considerations that are likely to govern the
determination of whether the COPA is consistent with the First Amendment.
Thanks to the ACLU and its fellow plaintiffs, it appears that a final judicial
resolution of these issues will, in fact, be made in the near future.

165. ACLU, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497.
166. Id. at 496-97.
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